Comments on a cultural reality between past and future.

This blog describes Metatime in the Posthuman experience, drawn from Sir Isaac Newton's secret work on the future end of times, a tract in which he described Histories of Things to Come. His hidden papers on the occult were auctioned to two private buyers in 1936 at Sotheby's, but were not available for public research until the 1990s.

Friday, August 5, 2016

Drone Precedents: Point and Click

The unmanned drone MQ-9 Reaper, made by General Atomics, designed in 2001, first introduced into use by the US Air Force in 2007. This photo is from Afghanistan. Image Source: US Air Force via Defense Update.

This is the third in three posts on discrepancies between declared meaning and hard reality and the problems those gaps cause in emerging Millennial history. Today's post focuses on warfare. The 2014 documentary Drone, directed by Norwegian director Tonje Hessen Schei, summarized the change from a critical perspective. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom reviewed the film in 2015:
"The international community has stressed that drone strikes involve killings without due process that are violating international law and human rights, most importantly the right to life. There have been strong concerns that drone operations do not gather sufficient information to establish legal targets, resulting in indiscriminate killings. The precision of drones, so fondly asserted by their supporters, is a myth.

Someone who knows all about this crude reality is Brandon Bryant, a former US Air Force drone operator diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, who is now speaking out to the world on what he experienced during his time flying drones. In the documentary, he describes the light-hearted, often nonchalant, atmosphere in the control room, half a world away from the people they were targeting, and how he himself grew more and more jaded for each strike."
The documentary (available at time of writing, here) sounds an alarm on drone development; the film regards drones as an international, not purely American, problem; and it criticizes the Republicans and especially the Democrats for their endorsement of the drone programme. The narration opens with an interview with Brandon Bryant, as he reflected on how drone operation dehumanized him:
"I didn't really understand what it meant to kill at first. It was horrible. Sometimes it plays itself over and over again in your head, so much that you, you just imagine who these people were. We sat in a box for nearly twelve hour shifts. I [was] typically on the night shift. It was quieter. All the lights were usually off, except for the light coming from the monitors. It was so weird just being able to watch people's lives. ... I remember watching a wedding. I mean, these were people enjoying themselves. These were people celebrating, like, a wedding. You know? Like - but someone in that wedding was a bad person, and at that moment, they were celebrating. It's just weird, like, I'm watching this person, and this person has no clue. We're the ultimate voyeurs, the ultimate Peeping Toms. No one's going to catch us, and we're getting orders to take these people's lives. It was just - point and click."
Bryant claimed most of his fellow drone pilots did not view their operations that way, and some threatened him when he came forward to criticize drones. At the other end of engagement, civilians sitting under drone attacks regard them as despicable and illegal. Lawyers in Pakistan have taken drone attack cases before their courts as criminal extrajudicial killings. But the paper trail disappears when it reaches the American government's doorstep, due to the confidentiality of unidentified authorities and top secret status of intelligence officers. In 2015, The Guardian called "Obama's drone panopticon" a "secret machine with no accountability." In the old military system, information can pinpoint those who violate military laws and court martial them. In the new military system, information disappears.

The verdict on conventional warfare from 2001 to 2008: Abu Ghraib prison torture in 2003 Image Source: Progressive Charlestown. The Senate committee report on torture was published on 30 December 2014. Image Source: Christian Science Monitor. Wife at the grave of an American soldier. Image Source: The Daily Call. Approximately half of veterans (over 1 million former military personnel) returned home to suffer PTSD, drug problems, convoluted governmental support, unemployment in the Great Recession, and other difficulties. A homeless veteran in Houston, Texas. Image Source: IFTBQP. Wiki: "In 2013, the United States Department of Veterans Affairs released a study that covered suicides from 1999 to 2010, which showed that roughly 22 veterans were committing suicide per day, or one every 65 minutes."

Barack Obama's drone programme grew out of a catastrophic evaluation of George W. Bush's conventional wars. The Americans faced huge criticism and problems over their handling of the War in Afghanistan (2001-2014) and the Iraq War (2003-present). Abu Ghraib prison, torture, and Guantanamo Bay became ugly mirrors which the big media held up to show a proud nation its shameful inhumanity. The media and experts challenged the justifications and WMD premises for the war. Bush's conventional war was also astronomically expensive. In 2004, Osama bin Laden stated that one of al-Qaeda's aims was to provoke the USA into military conflict to the point of bankruptcy. He almost succeeded. Critics blamed the 2008 meltdown partly on the cost of war. In 2013, Reuters reported that the Iraq War and its related aftermath could cost USD $6 trillion over the next four decades, including interest.

Enter the drone, a comparatively cheap, recessionary weapon. In 2015, The Daily Dot reported that Obama requested roughly USD $561 billion in defense spending for the following year, with a growing portion devoted to drones or drone research, to around USD $5 billion by 2016. This was the projected cost of 'soft defense' with a 'small footprint': "While controversial for a variety of reasons, the drone program was supposed to usher in the era of a slimmer, smarter military for the U.S." Bard College has a Center for the Study of the Drone, which broke down America's annual drone budget for 2016 (here) and 2017 (here). According to one PBS opinion piece, the Democrats paid for the drones by printing money, as part of recessionary quantitative easing.

So, Obama declared: war is peace. Drone technology effectively continued Bush's Middle Eastern military policy in a different style. Single, targeted drone attacks became more widespread, akin to drone bombing. The Intercept dug through leaked classified drone papers, especially those for Operation Haymaker in Afghanistan in 2012-2013, and found large numbers of civilian casualties. For all the earlier concerns in Iraq and Afghanistan, this was a troubling shift in operational perspective. The Democrats' policy obscured reality, and was conceptually, politically and philosophically dislocated from the reality it created. This war continued mostly out of the public eye, behind a façade of peace. The film Drone maintains that the sympathetic Democratic rhetoric of humanitarianism and frugal economy held the moral high ground over the sabre-rattling of hawkish Republicans. However, the Democrats' withdrawal of troops and peaceable rhetoric cynically, strategically - and progressively - continued the war with drone technology and mercenaries, who replaced American soldiers on the ground.

Blackwater gained public attention when four of their mercenaries were ambushed, killed and burned on a bridge in Fallujah, Iraq, on 31 March 2004. It took two military battles for the Americans to take the city. After the victory in December 2004, the Marines signed the bridge with their Latin motto. In the photo above, 3/5 is the 3rd Battalion, 5th Regiment of the Marines, also known as the Darkhorse. From 2005 to 2011, investigative reports linked birth defects in Fallujah to the US Army's use of white phosphorous. The incident showed how unconventional mercenaries and weapons overlapped with conventional forces and the media. Images Sources: Mount Holyoke University; flickr.

In 2008, Hillary Clinton condemned the Bush State Department's employment of the military contractor Blackwater. But a 2014 HuffPo investigation found that shortly thereafter, Clinton's State Department stepped up hiring of private armies; her office promised Blackwater (now known as Academi) USD $500 million in mercenary contracts. In 2010, Wired reported that Clinton's State Department signed a five-year contract worth over USD $10 billion with a mercenary umbrella group called, 'International Development Solutions,' which included Academi-formerly-known-as-Blackwater. In 2014, there were rumours that Academi and an affiliated, Barbados-based company, Greystone, were active in the Ukraine. Other Blackwater shell companies, like Paravant, have grimly ironic names (a paravent is a portable bedroom privacy screen). According to Wired, here are a few other names Blackwater, its subsidiaries, or related merc companies have taken on to shed baggage:
  • Total Intelligence Solutions
  • Technical Defense Inc.
  • Apex Management Solutions LLC
  • Aviation Worldwide Services LLC
  • Air Quest Inc.
  • Presidential Airways Inc.
  • EP Aviation LLC
  • Backup Training LLC
  • Terrorism Research Center
  • Xe Services LLC
  • Worldwide Protective Services
  • AAR Corp.
The employer-reviews Website, Glassdoor, has employees' reviews of International Development Solutions; one reads: "Great pay. Travel is awesome. [But y]ou're away from home quite often." Darker parts of the story emerged in 2016 about an embryonic private air force (here and here), while ex-Blackwater CEO Erik Prince aided in China's quiet imperial conquest of Africa. One blog devoted to overseas military contractors calls them "the best kept secret of the wars." Contractors and drones allowed war to disappear (largely) from the media; conflict faded into the background behind the term, 'deniability.' Regardless of the winner in the American presidential race, this approach will continue. The current foreign policy advisor to Donald Trump is Joseph Schmitz, a former Blackwater executive.

Even more than before, politicians separated cause from effect and meaning from reality. This policy created two contemporary historical narratives, the politicized metahistory, and the factual course of events. The misleading image of a kinder, gentler government became easier to cultivate, because warfare was conducted through several degrees of separation and obscured political responsibility. Drone argues that Obama disapproved of Guantanamo Bay, so he solved that problem by killing suspects with drones, thereby avoiding the public relations mess of capturing, incarcerating them and facing scrutiny over that process. Critics in Drone maintain that this policy by-passed international and national legal systems (as opposed to violating them, as the Bush administration had). Other critics assert that the same policy encouraged the rise of ISIS. Drones are one of the reasons why ISIS are so keen to provoke the Americans back into boots-on-the ground, hand-to-hand combat in the Middle East. In their eyes, a bloody human clash is the true contest between societies, and remote-piloted drones are the weapons of cowards.

Purported drone killing (12 November 2015) of 'Jihadi John' aka Mohammed Emwazi (born Muhammad Jassim Abdulkarim Olayan al-Dhafiri), a Londoner who beheaded several high-profile western captives for ISIS, including American journalist James Foley on 19 August 2014 (see my post on Foley's beheading here). ISIS confirmed Emwazi's death in January 2016. The gamer who posted this video on 13 November 2015 rejoices in the killing. This is likely the wrong footage, revealing public difficulty in confirming the details of drone warfare. According to the Daily Mail, Emwazi was killed on a street while talking on his cell phone. Video Source: Youtube

The psychological orientation of drone battle is different from conventional warfare. One army sits, thousands of miles away from the arena of action. Their engagement is virtual, disconnected from direct combat, and they target enemies dispersed among a civilian population. The documentary observes that human operators of drones will soon be replaced by computer algorithms, thus making the targeting of undesirable individuals in the world nearly fully automated. Proponents of algorithmic pilots argue that an algorithm is more objective than human drone operators. At present, the human decision to assassinate an individual or group depends on intelligence analysis and a chain of command. The intelligence is gathered through governmental monitoring of private citizens' information, combined with international intelligence tips - including, the film asserts - from the European Union, whose governments have not criticized Obama's policy on drones.

In DroneColonel Lawrence Wilkerson, Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell from 2002 to 2005, remarked that the advent of drones changes the legal connotations of war, and positions the soldier as more murderer than defender of his or her society. Drone operations demand a different kind of recruit, from soldiers who are physically, organizationally and strategically trained for combat, to soldiers who are computer gamers. The US military has developed unmanned airplane computer games to ferret out and attract drone pilot recruits at as early an age as possible. From Wilkerson in Drone:
"It's a very different youth group that we're dealing with, that we're forcing into this environment of killing. And it's a very different form of killing, when you're in Nevada and the people you're killing are ten thousand miles away. We have something in the armed forces that we call the 'warrior ethos.' You destroy that when you go out and kill people and you're totally invulnerable. I think the drone business, the distance imposed, amplifies this a hundredfold. And the distinction between killing for state purposes under just war theory and killing for state purposes with no vulnerability is, I think, the difference between killing in a way that is recognized and legalized, even, and murder. How did we get to the point where we're no longer warriors, we're murderers for the state?"

Steve Jackson created the 'Enough is Enough' Illuminati playing card in 1995. In the card games, New World Order Unlimited Edition Starter Set, the Complete Instructions for World Domination Factory Set, and the Illuminati Bavarian Fire Drill, Jackson spoofed paranoid New World Order theories. Conspiracy theorists take the game seriously, and believe Jackson had secret knowledge which makes the game of predictive guide of Millennial events. Image Source: Winter Watch.

The shift is not just technological. It involves a general application of political assassination. Any nation will have a nasty history of arm's length solutions for dealing with enemies or problematic people, either with snipers or assassins, now with drones. Conspiracy theorists have recently made much of the expanded 1982 Illuminati card game, which seems to feature the face of Donald Trump (see my posts on Trump here and here), and warns about snipers. The game is popular because it unites post-World War II history in one grand mythology, with some cards from the 1990s supposedly predicting events in the 2000s and 2010s, including the above obscure omen about Trump and snipers.

While distance killing and targeted assassinations are very old, the 'point and click' aspect of drones is new. The American government's decision to pick off its enemies with intelligence information, remote pilots, satellites and drones lends itself to conspiratorial anti-government or anti-corporate paranoia that domestic citizens - not just foreign threats - who are arbitrarily marked as terrorists, criminals, or transgressors could be tracked through their personal technological gadgets and similarly dispatched in the future. To add to the fear, the drone programme is associated with the CIA and the drones are piloted from the notorious Area 51 in Nevada. Civilian paranoia is only one problem which arises when taking conventional war out of warfare. Drones operate during officially-declared peacetime, under non-war conditions, in a grey area between military and civilian circumstances. Critics ask why drones could not then enter the domestic sphere. This is indeed happening, because of the confusing demilitarization of military actions. A 2015 documentary, below, observed that privacy laws do not yet exist to cope with non-military drones in American airspace.

2015: Non-military drones are poised to enter domestic and civilian airspace without corresponding regulations and laws. Video Source: Youtube.

If commentators in Drone were correct, and algorithms eventually take over drone operations, they could be meshed with algorithmic online surveillance, big data, and digital identification of threats to society. This is the frothing paranoid's futuristic nightmare: the computer crunches the numbers, finds you to be a threat to the state, and auto-dispatches a drone to find you and kill you, based on the location of your smartphone, with back-up satellite confirmation of your identity via facial recognition. Turn on the automated war program and let it run awhile.

The film, Eye in the Sky, shows technology like AeroVironment's Hummingbird, produced for DARPA. This is a 2011 demo. Video Source: Youtube. In July 2016, DARPA's most recent nano-structure innovation was a virus-like self-generating protein cage operating at the cellular level.

The PD 100 Black Hornet nano UAV developed by Prox Dynamics, home of "the world's smallest aircraft systems": "Sgt Carl Boyd, of First Battalion Royal Fusiliers, with a Black Hornet camera helicopter. Salisbury Plain, Wiltshire. The mini spy in the sky, which has a 20 minute fly time is already in use in Afghanistan." (2013) Video Source: Youtube. The Black Hornet 2013 demo is here.

Military nano spy drones (2014). Video Source: Youtube.

By contrast, a UK drone drama, Eye in the Sky (2015), depicted a system much less cavalier about this technology, with characters debating the rules of engagement and legality of drone strikes (the trailer is here). In the film, government officials pass the decision to strike up the chain of authority, while appealing to lawyers and collateral damage assessors, who complain that neither the law nor the law of averages are written to encompass these blurred civilian-military non-war situations. A fictional British Foreign Secretary debates political fallout with the general in command of the mission, asking how it would look if the footage of the operation was leaked on Youtube: "revolutions are fueled by postings to Youtube."

For their part, Youtubers were unimpressed by Eye in the Sky: "Lol the US bombed a fucking hospital full of children this year, do you really think they would give a shit about one girl [in the film]?" And another: "Like they would give a shit about a kid. Last month, they drone striked 50+ civilians in Syria, not ISIS, they were normal men, women and children." And another: "Yay! More propaganda posing as entertainment." In a March 2016 interview with Discover Magazine, the Eye in the Sky director, Gavin Hood, argued that the Reaper drone sits technologically between the old-fashioned sniper and the ballistic missile; but the moral, and legal questions around the drone as a weapon were eternal; and he felt the strategic aims of the policy failed:
"A lot of people talk about this Reaper drone as the savior of modern war and it’s brilliant and it minimizes collateral damage. It doesn’t minimize collateral damage any more than a sniper’s bullet, which actually does the job better. This is a tactical weapon. It is not a strategy, it is a weapon. What is the strategy in different circumstances that would best use or not use this weapon?

Those questions are questions that should be asked and have been asked for hundreds of years and we should not get distracted by the love of the tech. 'Do you like drones?' Well, I don’t know, what are you using the drone for? And what is the result of using the drone? Did we achieve the objective of reducing extremist ideology by taking out this individual? Or did we take the wrong individual out because our intelligence was bad? And that question applies whether you’re using a drone, a sniper’s bullet or a guillotine.

... My issue is: let’s not get so hung up on the question of the drone. Let’s know what the drone is, know what it can do as a tactical weapon. It can do things that a sniper’s bullet can’t. A sniper’s bullet can do what it can’t. It can do things that a ballistic missile can’t do. It depends on what you’re trying to achieve. The question is is the use of this weapon in the particular circumstances advancing the overall strategic objective of reducing extremism in the world? That, for me, is really the question."
Obama's small footprint war lost the public propaganda battle as much as Bush's conventional war did, but in a different way. Whereas before Americans were viewed as arrogant, greedy imperialist oppressors, now they are seen as imperialist hypocrites and cowards. A 2014 film, Good Kill, depicted these quandaries from the traumatized perspective of an American drone pilot (the trailer is here). Youtubers didn't believe the hand-wringing in this film, either:
"(JSOC?) just got stellar results illegally assassinating Mullah Mansour in Pakistan WITHOUT ... [Pakistan's] permission (CNN reported they had been notified, of course they didnt mention not until AFTERWARDS). So lets all welcome the new Taliban leader who will prove even more difficult to 'deal with' than Mansour."
And further: "they kill you and then make movies about how sad they are while doing it, typical american bs." It is misleading to consider drones as a purely American issue. We are in a time pocket in which other countries have not yet extensively developed or implemented drone technology. When they do, they may not make hand-wringing movies about the legality and morality of drone use. In Drone, Colonel Wilkerson was quoted as follows:
"The spread of this technology is alarming. There has never been any technology of warfare that isn't ultimately adopted by your enemy or enemies. Shall I say it's only a matter of time until we have a drone over New York City looking down on Manhattan and it isn't ours?"
On 12 February 2016, Fortune reported on global drone development, based on an analysis from New America. (Incidentally, New America counts Eric Schmidt, Google's Executive Chairman, as chairman of its board of directors.) The Fortune report remarked that at the very least, the following countries have militaristic drone capability: the USA, the UK, China, Israel, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, and South Africa. But the original analysis, which makes for sobering reading, reveals that drone design worldwide is far more extensive. The countries confirmed to be developing armed drones are: France, Greece, Russia, India, Italy, Pakistan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, and Turkey. And the list of countries producing drones in a secondary capacity, or buying drones with various levels of military capability, is very long, involving most of the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and parts of Africa. In Drone, P. W. Singer, author of Wired for War, claimed there were 87 countries in the world which were developing drones for military purposes.

Drone construction arrived rapidly over the past decade; it sits at the intersection of war, technology, and geopolitics. It is difficult to understand it quickly enough; but to fail to do so invites a frightening future. Imagine small, lethal military drones flying outside your window, let alone armed, unmanned planes poised over major cities. It is one of many concerns evolving too rapidly for the existing system. A final comment comes from P. W. Singer in Drone:
"As big a deal as the introduction of drones has been over the last decade, we're just at the start of this. The notion of a human pilot on the ground controlling every single thing that a robotic plane is doing? That's already outdated. What's coming, though, is also the chronologic movement, the movement of time. That's the software side of it, as we slowly move the human role from decision-making in time, remote action as it is right now, to algorithms making the decisions. To me, the overall challenge is the difference between the pace of technology and the pace of our human institutions. ... [T]echnology's moving at this incredibly fast pace, and yet our human institutions, our laws, our sense of ethics, our government policies, they move at a linear pace. And we have this phenomen[on] where the disconnect between them is not only there, but it's growing by greater and greater amounts."
The challenge falls to theorists and practitioners in human institutions to keep pace with technologists. That starts with separating the meta-story, or the outdated story, from the real story. The real story, in turn, must acknowledge the level technology has reached or will reach, so that our laws, institutions, ethics and governmental systems remain relevant and effective. If we do not do that, the entire order will be replaced very quickly by a set of international development solutions, improvised by those with the will to impose them.

See all my posts on Millennial views of past events.


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